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THE LAW’S DELAY 
 
Introduction 
Civil procedure and delay were born together. This is, of course, due to the fact that 
no lawsuit can be decided fairly without at least some minimum period of time in 
between first presenting the case to a court and obtaining a final judgement. 
Manifestly this type of delay is not problematic. Delay becomes a problem, however, 
if it can be classified as ‘undue delay’, i.e., when it is felt that too much time has 
elapsed between the filing of an action and its ultimate decision by the court. 
Although it is difficult to establish what amount of time can be classified as ‘too much 
time’, and also because opinions as regards this issue may differ from country to 
country and from period to period, it is no secret that undue delay has been part of 
modern procedure from almost its conception. This becomes evident when one studies 
the history of the Romano-canonical procedure, the ‘mother’ of most procedures on 
the European Continent. Already at the beginning of the thirteenth century and thus at 
an early stage in the development of the Romano-canonical procedure, a summary 
procedure was framed in order to decide a designated group of cases more quickly 
than the ordinary procedure allowed (Clementina Saepe). In this summary procedure, 
parts of the ordinary procedure could be omitted and it is clear a balance was sought 
between a quick administration of justice on the one hand and an acceptable end-
result (i.e., a judgement) on the other hand.1 Apparently, the ordinary procedure was 
deemed to be too slow for certain categories of cases. However, this was not a 
definitive solution to the problem of undue delay, as is shown by later complaints 
about the slowness of the litigation process and attempts to increase its expediency. 
 
Complaints as regards delay are not restricted to the Civilian systems of the European 
Continent, where the Romano-canonical system was most influential, but they are also 
part of the ‘life of the law’ in Common Law jurisdictions. This is apparent from 
literary sources, for example where Hamlet in his famous ‘To be or not to be’ 
complains about ‘the law’s delay’,2 and anyone familiar with the work of Charles 
Dickens will know that the problem has persisted ever since. (Of course, Dickens’ 
novel Bleak House is very well known in this connection. However, in his other 
novels, too, e.g., in The Pickwick Papers, Dickens criticises the slowness of the 
adjudication process in England). Recently, proposals made by a commission chaired 
by Lord Woolf, then Master of the Rolls, have resulted in reforms aimed at increasing 
the expedition of English civil procedure. 
 
                                                           
1 On Saepe see the paper of K.W. Nörr in this volume. When referring to papers included in this 
volume, only the author’s name will be mentioned. 
2 Althouomgh Hamlet was a Danish prince, we must assume that Shakespeare had English practice in 
mind when writing his play. 
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Even though there have been many more reform attempts and measures have been 
taken during the last 800 years in both Civilian and Anglo-American jurisdictions to 
accelerate civil litigation, complaints are still being voiced today. The legislature and 
rule-making authorities as well as numerous reform commissions continue to be 
occupied in curbing the evil of undue delay, often without much success. This may be 
due to various reasons, one of them being the fact that often not much attention is paid 
to earlier reform attempts and the reasons for their failure (or their temporary success). 
The lack of attention for the past becomes evident (and this is just one of many 
examples) if one consults the reports ‘Access to Justice’ by Lord Woolf and his 
commission. Although numerous relevant reports are available in the British 
Parliamentary Papers on the deficiencies of the English civil justice system since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Lord Woolf and his commission only consulted a 
few of them. This fact can, however, not be held against Lord Woolf since the sheer 
volume of the available reports is forbidding. Nevertheless, putting these reports aside 
is in my opinion not a desirable solution. One would have expected, at least from a 
continental perspective, that academic studies would have made the findings of the 
various parliamentary commissions accessible to the public, but this is not the case. 
Although at present this situation may be changing due, for example, to the interesting 
study of Patrick Polden on the history of the County Court,3 a large amount of work 
still needs to be done.4 
 
The absence of an in-depth knowledge of past experiences may result in inaccurate 
findings for the future and also in the idea that the current problems in the area of civil 
procedure are unique (which they certainly are not). In an Explanatory Memorandum 
on repealed Dutch legislative proposals on civil procedure from the 1990s,5 for 
example, one finds the following quote:  
 
‘[c]urrently [my emphasis] [...] civil matters [should] in the first place proceed 
quickly if we wish to comply with the societal demands of the time and with 
the requirements of the proper administration of justice’. 
 
It seems that it would have been better to omit the word ‘currently’, since the need to 
litigate expeditiously has been felt at all times. Consequently, undue delay was, and 
still is, regarded as a problem. 
 
The absence of an interest in the history of delay in civil procedure is also shown by 
the fact that measures that have proven to be unsuccessful in the past are repeatedly 
reintroduced, even in the same country, in order to fight delay. It is my conviction that 
if the legislature and the rule-making authorities were to have taken past experiences 
                                                           
3 A History of the County Court, 1846-1971, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Another 
interesting study is R. Stevens, Law and Politics. The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976, 
London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979. 
4 Unfortunately, a paper on nineteenth-century reforms in English civil procedure aiming at reducing 
delay could not be included in the present volume since an author willing to write such a paper could 
not be found. In a forthcoming volume on Common Traditions in Civil Procedural Law, that is 
currently being prepared by A.W. Jongbloed (Utrecht), P. Oberhammer (Zürich), A. Wijffels (Louvain-
la-Neuve) and myself (with contributions of N. Andrews – Cambridge - , J. Blackie – Strathclyde - , L. 
Cadiet – Paris - and P. van Orshoven – Louvain), and that is to be published by Intersentia Publishers, a 
chapter on the English nineteenth-century reforms will be included. 
5 Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, 24 651, number 3 (memorie van toelichting), p. 45. 
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into consideration, many of the mistakes made by earlier generations could have been 
avoided. They would certainly not have been repeated. 
 
Apart from an historical (comparative) approach to undue delay in civil procedure, a 
modern comparative approach is also very much needed. Although as regards modern 
systems of civil procedure important studies are available,6 one can certainly not claim 
that a sufficient body of literature does exist. This may partly be due to the fact that in 
many countries civil procedure is not regarded as a serious academic subject of study 
(notably in England), but usually seen as something that belongs exclusively to the 
domain of practitioners. Although there are some exceptions, such as Germany and 
Italy, in other countries chairs of civil procedure are non-existent or only filled part-
time. This is unfortunate, since, as German and Italian scholars have shown, the 
subject is worthy of academic inquiry. 
 
In order to enlarge the body of comparative and historical literature on the subject of 
undue delay in civil procedure, a conference was organised at the Maastricht Law 
Faculty (within the framework of the Ius Commune Research School) on April 24-25, 
2003. Its aim was to bring together legal scholars with a comparative and historical 
interest in civil procedure. The papers presented at this conference are published in the 
present volume. Although scholars from many jurisdictions were invited, in the end 
papers were only presented by colleagues from Europe, North America and South 
Africa. 
 
A decision was taken not to issue a questionnaire to the scholars presenting a paper 
and to leave to them the choice of the specific topics to be treated in their paper (as 
long as delay in civil procedure was the main theme). Since the present volume is 
intended as a first attempt, hopefully resulting in further publications,7 it was felt that 
the authors should be given the largest amount of freedom in framing their papers in 
order to obtain a good survey of as many relevant themes as possible. 
 
Causes of undue delay 
The study of the causes of undue delay in civil litigation is not an easy topic. 
Empirical data are often not available. Consequently, the Hungarian approach of 
obliging judges to fill out monthly reports with detailed causes of case 
postponements8 may be beneficial, although the administrative burden caused by this 
approach cannot be disregarded; it might hinder the judges from devoting a sufficient 
amount of time to adjudicating cases. Given the lack of data, more than once the 
student of civil procedure needs to rely on the rather impressionistic views that can be 
found in documents related to new legislation and rules of court. Some authors 
                                                           
6 E.g., A.A.S. Zuckerman, Civil Justice in Crisis. Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedure, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1999. Also in the Netherlands, the Interim Report of a commission appointed 
to re-evaluate the Dutch law of civil procedure contains an extensive chapter on foreign systems: 
W.D.H. Asser, H.A. Groen, J.B.M. Vranken (with assistance of I.N. Tzankova), Een nieuwe balans. 
Interimrapport fundamentele herbezinning Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, The Hague, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers, 2003. 
7 In this respect a project financed by the German Gerda Henkel Foundation on the History of Undue 
Delay in Civil Procedure can be mentioned. I have the honour of being the general editor of the volume 
that will result from this project. The volume will be published as part of the series Comparative 
Studies in Continental and Anglo-American Legal History (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin). 
8 F. Glatz. 
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suggest that it is questionable whether these documents identify the real reasons for 
undue delay. In the present volume, Paul Oberhammer suggests, and I think rightly so, 
that the aim of policy-making in the field of procedure is quite often not to speed up 
litigation, but merely to obtain savings for the national budget. The author states that 
in his view apparent shortcomings can be overcome by investing more money in the 
judicial infrastructure, but, since this is an expensive solution, the legislature 
frequently chooses the ineffective but relatively cheap, simple and politically visible 
instrument of legislation. Additionally, on the basis of nineteenth-century materials 
related to the French Code de procédure civile, Alain Wijffels is of the opinion that 
the real problem the legislature tries to fight is not so much undue delay. Instead, the 
related problem of high costs associated with civil litigation is identified as the main 
focus of attention. According to Wijffels, it seems that in nineteenth-century France 
there was not a pressing need for the speeding up of civil lawsuits as long as costs 
could be kept under control.  
 
These and similar observations should, in my opinion, be kept in mind when 
evaluating documents in which the legislature and rule-making authorities express 
their views on undue delay and the solutions to this problem. This is not to say, 
however, that the reasons we find expressed in these documents are not worthy of 
serious consideration, but only that some degree of caution is needed. 
 
What are the reasons that were and still are advanced for the slow pace of litigation? 
The papers in the present volume contain a large selection of factors that have been 
identified over the centuries as lying at the root of slowness. It is not possible to 
discuss these factors exhaustively in this introduction. What I would like to do here is 
to present a selection with the aim of identifying some common themes. I have 
intentionally limited myself as far as possible to the information that can be found in 
the present volume, although there were occasions when there was temptation to go 
beyond what can be found in the papers included in this book. For reasons of 
convenience, I shall discuss my selection of factors under three headings: (a) external 
factors, (b) factors related to the actors involved in civil litigation, court organisation 
and the court budget, and (c) procedural factors. 
 
External factors 
Delay in civil litigation may well be the result of factors unrelated to court 
organisation and procedure, i.e., to factors that I shall call ‘external factors’ in this 
introduction. Several of these factors are mentioned and/or discussed in the present 
volume. A good example of delay caused by external factors can be found in Paul 
Carrington’s paper on asbestos litigation in the United States. When discussing the 
avalanche of cases that have been brought in the United States by victims of diseases 
related to the use of asbestos during the larger part of the twentieth century and the 
resulting crippling caseload of the courts, the author points out that the absence of 
public health care and unemployment insurance systems in the United States that are 
comparable to those of many European Countries has been an incentive to victims to 
acquire compensation for their illness through the United States court system.9 
                                                           
9 An interesting essay dealing with the outlook of the American justice system and ‘external factors’ in 
general was published by P. Carrington under the title ‘Die Streit-Macht’ in Der Tagesspiegel, number 
18 288, Sunday 2 November 2003, p. 7. 
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The importance of ‘external factors’ as regards undue delay in Europe appears in the 
papers on Hungary and Poland. Both Ferenc Glatz and Fryderyk Zoll indicate that 
after the changes in the political and economic systems of those countries, the 
caseload of the courts increased to a considerable extent causing delays in the hearing 
of cases.10 Most likely, the transition to a market economy was one of the main 
reasons behind this development. 
 
The prevailing political and economic system also lay at the base of undue delay 
discussed in some of the papers focussing on the Ancien Régime. The absence of a 
separation of powers, for example, contributed to slowness. This is apparent where 
Mark Godfrey and Ditlev Tamm mention the ability of the Sovereign to interfere with 
the administration of justice in Scotland and Denmark respectively. By means of royal 
letters addressed to the higher royal courts, the Sovereign was able to influence the 
hearing of an action in these jurisdictions. My own paper11 shows that a similar 
situation existed in the Low Countries, where the Sovereign, at least in certain cases, 
tended to interfere if he was of the opinion that the hearing of an action should be 
halted in order to attempt an amicable settlement of the case. Apparently, the delay 
caused by this interference was considered to be unjustified; in the Netherlands and in 
other jurisdictions we find rules ordering the courts to ignore the Sovereign’s letters. 
At first sight this may seem odd, because both the letters interfering with the 
administration of justice and the rules ordering the courts to ignore them were issued 
in the Sovereign’s name. However, the situation becomes understandable if one 
realises that the letters interfering with the administration of justice were issued by an 
‘administrative’ body other than the body promulgating rules against them. 
 
Apart from political and economic ‘external factors’, the physical geography of a 
country and the available means of communication may have an effect as regards the 
expediency with which cases are being handled by the courts. These factors are 
discussed in Serge Dauchy’s paper on colonial Québec. Dauchy takes the reader to the 
seventeenth century and shows that the nature of the landscape of Québec and the 
available means of communication were such, that the time-limits that had been fixed 
for civil litigation in France in the Ordonnance civil of Louis XIV, could not be 
observed. A more flexible approach to time-limits was needed and, consequently, the 
Ordinance was modified. Anyone familiar with the history of procedure will know 
that this must have been felt to be a dangerous approach by many law-making 
authorities throughout the centuries since for a long time the general opinion was that 
it was exactly flexibility that resulted in undue delay. 
 
For a last ‘external factor’ influencing the speed with which cases can be handled by 
the courts I again refer to the paper of Ditlev Tamm. This author states that cases were 
expeditiously handled by the courts in medieval and early-modern Denmark and holds 
that the relative paucity of legislation may have been one of the reasons behind this 
situation. I think this is a very pertinent observation with respect to the situation today, 
                                                           
10 A heavy caseload is also mentioned as a cause of delay in other papers (e.g., W. de Vos, P. Yessiou-
Faltsi). 
11 See also my Litigation and Legislation. Civil Procedure at First Instance in the Great Council for 
the Netherlands in Malines (1522-1559) (= Studia 66), Brussels, Archives Générales du Royaume et 
Archives de l’État dans les Provinces, 1997, p. 61-63 and 327. 
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where the amount of legislation that is being poured out over the citizen is growing 
more quickly than ever before. Reducing the number of rules and regulations may not 
only be beneficial to individuals and stimulate economic activity, but it may also make 
our court system more healthy. 
 
Factors related to the actors involved in civil litigation, court organisation, and the 
court budget 
Many of the factors that have been discussed under the heading ‘external factors’ 
cannot be influenced by law reformers aiming at increasing the expedition of civil 
actions. As regards the factors dealt with under the present heading the position is 
different, but, nonetheless, it seems that some of the topics discussed below have not 
enjoyed any significant degree of attention in any of the periods discussed in this 
volume. This may be due to the fact that influencing these factors involves an increase 
in the budget for the judiciary. Measures that cost money are, for obvious reasons, not 
very popular with those who have to furnish that money. Therefore, means are sought 
to fight the evil of delay in another manner. Something that is at the same time 
promising and relatively inexpensive is to try to influence the procedural attitude of 
the actors involved in civil litigation. I shall start with discussing this theme. 
 
The actors involved in civil litigation 
In his paper, Daan Asser stresses that currently litigation is too much perceived by 
lawyers as well as by courts as a (regulated) battle and not as a means to solve an 
existing problem between the parties by way of co-operation. Asser, just as Lord 
Woolf has done in England, emphasises that we need a change in culture. The 
participants in the litigation process should stop viewing litigation as a battle, and 
begin co-operating in order to solve their problem. Asser claims that one should look 
at civil litigation ‘in terms of helping people to solve their difficulties instead of 
helping them to fight them out’. Co-operation between the parties and a joint 
responsibility is needed. The author, who is currently involved in the reform of civil 
procedure in the Netherlands, suggests that courts should not decide procedural 
difficulties in the same manner as the merits of the case. In his opinion, procedural 
matters should be regarded as matters of management. Nevertheless, co-operation still 
is a distant goal in many countries. As a result, different kinds of procedural tactics are 
used which do not guarantee an expeditious decision of the action. One may, for 
example, refer to the tendency of litigants to keep their cards close to their chest and 
only at a relatively late stage inform the court and their opponent of their actual 
position. This is not only problematic in Continental but also in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. Wouter de Vos, for example, stresses that it is a problem in South 
Africa, a country that, as far as civil procedure is concerned, clearly belongs to the 
Anglo-American tradition (of course, in the area of substantive private law South 
Africa, with its Roman-Dutch Law, may be characterised as a so-called ‘mixed legal 
system’). 
 
The attitude of the judges is mentioned as a cause of delay by Michael Macnair. This 
author focuses on the personal predisposition of the judges. Judges may, for a variety 
of reasons, be over-cautious in ensuring that due process is followed. Macnair 
illustrates his point of view with the example of Chancellor King who showed such an 
attitude as an equity judge in the eighteenth century, according to Macnair due to his 
Common-Law background. The author states: ‘Rigorous defence of the rights of 
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parties […] to bright-line rules and to due process and procedure, may naturally tend 
to produce delays additional to those inherent in various concrete systems of judicial 
procedure’. As regards eighteenth-century Danish judges, a similar observation is 
made by Ditlev Tamm, who notes that these judges gradually found it safer to grant 
adjournments in order not to be accused of denial of justice than to proceed 
expeditiously. 
 
Not only the procedural attitude of the actors involved in civil litigation, but also other 
factors related to them play a role as regards the expedition with which cases are 
handled by the courts. One factor is the quality of court staff. Quality may of course be 
enhanced by training programmes,12 but at the same time good selection mechanisms 
are indispensable. In this context, Hamilton Bryson discusses the fact that in 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century England many public offices, including those of 
the clerical officers of the courts of law, had become sinecures. The holders of these 
offices, Bryson states, ‘were paid nominal salaries, if any at all, that had been fixed in 
the middle ages’. ‘[T]hey supported themselves by fees that were, by ancient tradition, 
attached to the various services they rendered’. Additionally, they did not necessarily, 
perform the duties attached to the office themselves, but appointed a deputy to do the 
actual work for a small salary. Of course, as a result of this system there were no 
guarantees that court officials were competent and, consequently, delays could be 
expected. 
 
Although sinecures do not exist anymore, the selection of court staff should remain 
the focus of attention of those who are interested in avoiding unnecessary delays in 
court. Optimal circumstances for selecting the most able professionals should be 
created and maintained. A scenario, sketched by Ferenc Glatz, should be avoided. 
This author holds that by not offering an attractive career opportunity to talented 
young lawyers, counter-selection takes place, leading to the courts being staffed with 
low quality professionals. This problem may be aggravated by appointments of judges 
and other court staff for political or personal reasons, something that is mentioned as a 
problem by Hamilton Bryson and Alan Uzelac. At the same time, the papers in this 
volume also show that the involvement of highly skilled professionals in the 
administration of justice is not a guarantee of expeditious procedure. From Ditlev 
Tamm’s paper it even appears that courts staffed with non-professional lawyers deal 
with cases with more dispatch than courts staffed with professionals. In addition, 
Serge Dauchy mentions that in colonial Québec the presence of learned legal counsel 
was felt to complicate matters and result in delay. Consequently, the colonial 
authorities forbade litigants to make use of the services of legal counsel. Of course, 
that this approach was based on Luther’s stereotype of ‘Juristen, böse Christen’ is 
clear, even though there may have been some truth in the opinion of the colonial 
authorities in Québec. This is demonstrated by Ditlev Tamm, who claims that from 
the eighteenth century, when legal counsel became involved in litigation in Denmark, 
delay became a serious problem. A cautious observer might, I think, agree with the 
opinion mentioned in Alan Uzelac’s paper, that the presence of lawyers does not 
always lead to effective and speedy litigation. 
 
                                                           
12 A. Uzelac. 
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One final interesting issue related to the actors involved in the litigation process that I 
would like to mention here is the manner in which court staff is paid. The method of 
payment should not be an incentive for complicating and increasing court business. 
Here sinecures in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England are again relevant. 
Because the holders of these sinecures were paid by fees that were attached to the 
various services they rendered, there was an incentive to increase business, i.e., to 
require unneeded services and therefore delay.13 Although, as far as I am aware, a 
system in which court staff are directly paid by the litigants for the services they 
render does currently not exist in any of the countries discussed in this volume, the 
history of sinecures shows that any interest (financial or other) of court staff in 
particular cases should be avoided at all costs. A conditio sine qua non for a 
disinterested approach to cases from the financial point of view is of course paying 
judges and court staff a decent salary, and it is clear that this is still problematic, even 
in some parts of the Western, democratic world. 
 
Court organisation 
Court organisation determines, at least to a large extent, the actual amount of time that 
a court can devote to administering justice. Various papers in the present volume point 
out, that delay was and is caused by the fact that judges, for various reasons, may in 
fact devote too little time to actually hearing and deciding cases. In medieval and 
early-modern Denmark, for example, the royal court only met once a year.14 The time 
devoted to hearing cases was felt to be insufficient in medieval England, where the 
central courts seem to have been in session for only about twenty weeks each year.15 
At the German Reichshofrat of the Ancien Régime extended court vacations were en 
vogue.16 In nineteenth-century Finland problems existed at the local court level.17 
Even when courts are in session for a reasonable amount of time, however, the judges 
might be hindered from hearing cases due to other duties. This might have been the 
case in eighteenth-century England: Michael Macnair states that the non-judicial 
business of the equity courts (e.g., the administration of estates and guardianship) took 
a lot of time of the judges. Even today, problems continue to exist. As regards 
Hungary, for example, Ferenc Glatz suggests that it would be a good idea to introduce 
professional management in the courts in order to free judges for their core 
adjudicative work. Professional management can, for example, be introduced by 
creating a Council for the Judicature (e.g., the Raad voor de Rechtspraak in the 
Netherlands).18 Isabel Velayos claims that in Spain freeing judges for their core 
adjudicative work could be achieved by extending the tasks of the clerks of the 
registry, who, in that country, are fully capable of handling some of the matters that 
are currently being handled by professional judges. 
 
The Court Budget 
The quality of the judicial infrastructure and, consequently, the expediency with which 
cases can be handled in court, is to a large extent dependent on the amount of money 
that the state is willing to spend on the courts. Unfortunately, in many countries this 
                                                           
13 W.H. Bryson. 
14 D. Tamm. 
15 P. Brand. 
16 W. Sellert. 
17 J. Kekkonen. 
18 A.W. Jongbloed. 
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amount is far below what is actually needed. The absence of adequate financial 
resources is a serious impediment to improving procedure. Jukka Kekkonen shows 
that in nineteenth and twentieth-century Finland reform attempts came to an early halt 
due to the lack of financial resources. Inadequate budgets may also give rise to salaries 
that are too low to attract competent court staff. Additionally, inadequate budgets may 
lie at the root of an insufficient number of judges at the courts. An insufficient number 
of judges is considered to be a delaying factor in Hungary.19 Similar observations are 
made by Isabel Velayos for Spain. The traditional solution of this problem (at least if 
we take the last two centuries into consideration) is the abolition of panels of judges 
and the introduction of the single judge and/or a reporter-judge.20 In cases where 
panels are deemed to be necessary, the problem of an insufficient number of judges is 
often tackled by appointing university professors or even legal counsel as unpaid part-
time judges (this happens, for example, in the Netherlands). Although this offers 
people with those backgrounds a good opportunity to gain experience on the Bench, 
especially the appointment of legal counsel has recently turned out to be problematic 
from the point of view of the impartiality of the court. Nevertheless, imaginative 
solutions are needed because it is a fact that in several countries the number of judges 
is insufficient.  
 
Extra resources will also allow the courts to use modern means of communication and 
data processing more extensively. Various authors argue that modern technology may 
contribute to expediency.21 Money is also needed to achieve logistical improvements 
in order to use court-time more efficiently, e.g., by transferring some tasks from the 
judges to other court officials (clerks),22 by outsourcing tasks,23 and by introducing 
professional management of the courts. 
 
Procedural causes 
Under the heading of procedural causes of delay I shall address some of the reasons 
for delay, advanced by the contributors to this volume, which find their origin in the 
rules on jurisdiction and the rules of procedure, as well as in the manner in which 
these rules are applied. 
 
Jurisdiction 
Complicated rules on jurisdiction and the availability of means to challenge 
jurisdiction may be a significant source of delay. This was one of the problems the 
Austrian law reformer Franz Klein tried to tackle at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Unfortunately, as regards jurisdiction, Klein’s proposals for reform were unsuccessful, 
although at present conflicts concerning subject-matter jurisdiction are extremely 
limited in number in Austria due to later reforms in this area.24 Similar problems exist 
or have existed in other countries. In the present volume we find overlapping and 
competing jurisdictions being mentioned as a source of delay in, e.g., early-modern 
Scotland,25 eighteenth-century England,26 nineteenth-century Finland,27 and modern 
                                                           
19 F. Glatz. 
20 A.W. Jongbloed, A. Uzelac, P. Yessiou-Faltsi. 
21 See for information on his subject the papers of W. Rechberger & T. Klicka, I. Velayos, A. Uzelac. 
22 I. Velayos. 
23 A. Uzelac. 
24 W.H. Rechberger & T. Klicka. 
25 M. Godfrey. 
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Croatia.28 In Finland, problems in the area of jurisdiction have, in the nineteenth 
century, been solved by abolishing certain types of first-instance (i.e., trial) courts.29 In 
the Netherlands, some of the measures that have been taken to achieve a fusion of the 
courts of first instance as well as the so-called ‘switch provisions’30 may also result in 
a more simple jurisdictional structure and fewer jurisdictional problems. However, in 
other countries simplifying jurisdictional rules is apparently not high on the agenda 
since there it is felt that the introduction of new, specialised tribunals is a means to 
fight delay. 
 
Procedure 
Throughout the centuries, a variety of procedural rules, as well as procedural 
guarantees, including due process,31 have been identified as lying at the root of delay 
in civil litigation. As stated above, empirical research in this respect is often lacking, 
and, especially in proposals concerning (draft) legislation rules on procedure may 
have been identified as the cause of delay in order to avoid the introduction of 
measures more costly than a change in the rules. In other words, these proposals may 
give the false impression that it is mainly the existing rules that cause the problem of 
delay. Nevertheless, the identification of particular rules as being dilatory in nature in 
various countries and at various periods in time has, in my opinion, some significance 
even though more in-depth research into this matter is obviously needed. 
 
A preliminary remark that should be made here is that delay is often not the result of 
the rules themselves, but of their application in practice. Expeditious proceedings can 
only be achieved if the rules of procedure are applied in a flexible manner. At least, 
this is the obvious conclusion to which the observations of various authors in this 
volume must lead. In the papers of some of these authors (e.g., those of Paul Brand, 
Ton Jongbloed and Isabel Velayos) strict procedural formalism is identified as a 
source of delay. To give just one example: In medieval England minor faults in the 
original writ or in the plaintiff’s count could lead to a dismissal of the claim and, 
consequently, to delays.32 At the same time, flexibility in the application of the rules, 
e.g., rules on time-limits, may in itself be a source of delay, and thus in this respect a 
balance must be found. 
 
A second preliminary remark is that if one decides to fight delay with additional rules, 
one should make sure that these rules are clear and effective. Peter Gottwald discusses 
the modern German rule that the judge may set deadlines for performing procedural 
acts. If judges have not set any deadlines, however, they may preclude the parties from 
performing acts only if the admission of their arguments would delay ending the 
proceedings and the party concerned has acted with gross negligence. Obviously, this 
approach leaves much room for interpretation. Consequently, Peter Gottwald states, 
there was considerable debate in Germany as to when new argument would delay the 
settlement of the case. The Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that 
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it would be improper to preclude new arguments if the court bears some co-
responsibility for their belated pleading or if they are no longer contested. Due to this 
interpretation, the preclusion rules have lost much of their effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
rules on preclusion remains a popular means to reduce delay in the German-speaking 
world and beyond.33 
 
Turning now to the procedural rules and guarantees as well as fundamental principles 
that have been identified as lying at the root of delay: First, the adversary system or 
the passive role of the judge in civil litigation has been identified as causing delay, for 
example by Lord Woolf in England, and by Wouter de Vos (South Africa) and Isabel 
Velayos (Spain) in the present volume. Alan Uzelac and Kjell Modéer do not go that 
far, but it nevertheless appears from their papers that it is a mistake to think that 
adversarial proceedings are more expeditious than proceedings of a more inquisitorial 
nature. The problem of the slowness of adversarial proceedings may, according to 
some, be overcome by case management or, more generally, by increasing the powers 
of the judge.34 According to others, criminal procedure may serve as a model in this 
respect.35 
 
In this volume we also find the opinion that adversarial proceedings actually increase 
expediency, e.g. in the papers of Jukka Kekkonen (Finland) and Ferenc Glatz 
(Hungary). In Hungary, it is felt that delays can be avoided by a less active judge. 
Ferenc Glatz states that it is, in his opinion, not the task of the judge to brief the 
parties about their rights or to draw their attention to additional opportunities to 
expand their claims. Indeed, the inquisitorial type of judge of the Socialist era is not 
an example to be followed; an increase in the judge’s powers should not result in the 
judge becoming a party to the suit. To me, it seems, that finding the right mixture of 
elements from the adversarial and the inquisitorial model of litigation should be the 
aim of law reformers. In other words, various aspects of both types of litigation should 
be taken into consideration in order to create an optimal procedure and in order to 
avoid situations where the legislature cannot make up its mind and constantly 
oscillates between the two extremes, as was the case in Sweden in the twentieth 
century.36 
 
Delay is often associated with the observance of procedural guarantees. An example is 
the rule that both parties should be heard by the court (audiatur et altera pars). As a 
result of this rule, defendants may delay the course of the proceedings by not entering 
a timely appearance in court and thus obliging the plaintiff to have them re-
summoned. Defaulting defendants are, therefore, a serious problem.37 Since the 
principle of audiatur et altera pars is part and parcel of the Romano-canonical 
tradition,38 maybe even more generally of the Roman-Christian tradition (the rule was 
also observed in Paradise where, according to the Book of Genesis, God himself 
summoned Adam with the words ‘Adam, ubi es?’), delays caused by the observance 
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of this principle are as old as procedure itself. In this respect I may refer to the 
observations of Paul Brand on medieval England and Mark Godfrey on early-modern 
Scotland. Interestingly enough, however, Godfrey states that judging by the absence of 
rules to curb these delays in Scotland, they were originally not felt to be a problem 
(i.e., they were not classified as ‘undue delay’). 
 
Related to the idea that both parties should have the opportunity to state their case to 
the court are the so-called essoins which we find in medieval England as well as on 
the Continent. Defendants who had been duly summoned but who were prevented 
from making an appearance, could avoid being declared to be in default by sending a 
messenger communicating valid reasons why no appearance was entered. Of course, 
these essoins would cause further delays if accepted by the court.39 
 
The idea that all relevant parties should be able to state their case can be pursued to 
extremes. Michael Macnair mentions that in the period studied by him (seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century England), one of the major procedural obstacles was the need 
to have all possible parties properly served and to restart proceedings whenever any 
party died or any female party married.  
 
Another topic that is directly related to delay is the adjournment of the hearing of a 
case. Obviously, adjournments are potentially harmful for expedition. To what extent 
expedition may be affected appears, for example, in adjournments to view land in 
medieval England, discussed by Paul Brand. Additionally, adjournments may become 
extra harmful if they are related to interlocutory proceedings resulting in a 
postponement of the hearing of the action on the merits. Limiting the number and 
length of the adjournments as well as reducing the dilatory effects of interlocutory 
proceedings is regularly advocated as a means to curb delay. Although some 
flexibility must be allowed in individual cases, it has been observed that the courts 
should not be left too much discretion in granting adjournments. Hungary is a good 
example of a country where strict rules have been introduced in order to avoid 
adjournments becoming a major source of delay.40 
 
Evidentiary proceedings are notorious for their dilatory nature. Various reasons may 
be advanced as to why this is the case. In some jurisdictions, for example South 
Africa, part of the blame can be put on the absence of rules limiting the number of 
witnesses a party may summon. According to Wouter de Vos this is a feature of the 
adversary system in his country that should be changed. In medieval England, part of 
the problem was caused by the unwillingness of jurors to make a quick appearance,41 
whereas in courts that applied the Romano-canonical procedure, the rule that the 
depositions of witnesses were only made known to the parties at a relatively late stage 
caused delay. Stephen Waddams states that the English ecclesiastical courts, whose 
procedure was strongly influenced by the Romano-canonical procedure, suffered as a 
result of this, something that he demonstrates by studying the findings of the 
nineteenth-century Ecclesiastical Courts Commission. 
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Also related to procedures that find their inspiration in the Romano-canonical 
procedure and proof, is the absence of immediacy when hearing witnesses. According 
to Pelia Yessiou-Faltsi, this is felt to be an important delaying factor in Greece. 
Indeed, the presence of the judge in charge of the case when witnesses are being 
questioned may promote expeditious procedure. At the same time, however, one 
should realise that the hearing of witnesses by a commissioner of the court and 
consequent mediacy was at one time introduced precisely in order to save court time 
and to fight delay. 
 
After a case has been litigated, further delay may be the result of the court not being 
able or willing to pronounce a timely judgement. This occurred at the German 
Reichshofrat, where, according to Wolfgang Sellert, it was a serious delaying factor. 
Related to this problem was the employment by the parties of so-called solliciteurs at 
the early-modern Great Council of the Low Countries. There, these solliciteurs had to 
petition the court over and over again to pronounce judgment, apparently because the 
court did not render a timely judgement ex officio.42 In today’s world pronouncing 
judgements in time still seems to be problematic. To attack this problem, measures 
have been introduced in some countries, e.g., in Greece and the Netherlands, allowing 
courts to deliver summary rulings in certain types of cases. In Greece, summary 
rulings are allowed in interlocutory matters, whereas in the Netherlands, the Supreme 
Court (Hoge Raad) may decide to issue such a judgement on the merits if it is of the 
opinion that the judgement of the lower court, submitted to its scrutiny, may be upheld 
and does not give rise to fundamental legal questions. 
 
On the basis of the above, one may conclude that the standard procedure has various 
features that are not satisfactory from the perspective of delay. Some are of the 
opinion that summary procedures at first instance (and on appeal)43 are the solution to 
this problem. Such simplified procedures may be an adaptation of the standard 
procedure or have a completely different outlook.44 An example of the former type of 
procedure is one that allowed the court to combine together steps that under the 
standard Romano-canonical procedure had to be taken consecutively. We find this 
type of summary procedure, for example, at the medieval and early-modern English 
ecclesiastical courts.45 Additionally, summary procedures could allow some of the 
steps in the ordinary procedure to be omitted altogether, as is demonstrated by Knutt 
Wolfgang Nörr (Clementina Saepe). 
 
Today, experiments with summary procedures continue to take place. An example is 
the so-called ‘accelerated regimen’ in the Netherlands, an experiment originally 
started at the Rotterdam court that has resulted in changes to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Features of this regimen are strict time-limits, the harmonisation of time-
limits and the rule that the summons itself should include a response to any 
anticipated defence.46 Similar experiments have taken place earlier in the twentieth 
century in Germany (the Stuttgart model) and in Sweden. In Germany, the model was 
inspired by criminal procedure and the aim was to prepare a case in a preliminary 
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stage in such a manner that it could be decided in one Haupttermin.47 In Sweden the 
initiative was taken by the Chief Justice in a first instance court of Gothenburg. He 
introduced an oral, concentrated procedure in his courtroom, in which the parties and 
their lawyers had to be present at the first court meeting.48 Another approach was 
chosen in Hungary, where the National Judicial Council may select cases pending 
before the ordinary courts in order to be dealt with in extraordinary or expedited 
proceedings.49 
 
Currently, the introduction of different procedural tracks for different categories of 
cases is very popular (e.g. England, Austria). An early example of a specific track for 
a specific group of cases is the debt collection procedures that have been introduced in 
various countries. Debt collection procedures are popular in, e.g., Austria50 and 
Germany. The introduction of a debt collection procedure is currently being discussed 
in the Netherlands,51 and it is now also on the European agenda. 
 
It is something of a paradox that summary procedures may not only be a solution for 
delay, but also the cause of it. This issue is discussed by Fryderyk Zoll in his paper on 
Poland. The author notes that delays in summary procedures may be the result of, for 
example, the impossibility of effecting a joinder of claims or of parties. Additionally, 
one should be aware of the fact that the creation of too many exceptions to the 
standard procedure, i.e., too much variation in procedure, inevitably results in delay. 
The Spanish experience is instructive in this respect. Under the old 1881 Code of 
Civil Procedure the multiplicity of procedural tracks available caused delays, for 
example due to the fact that the time-limits that had to be applied in a particular case 
were not clear. Spain is not the only example of a country where procedural 
differentiation resulted in problems: it seems that the same was true for Greece.52 
 
The availability of appeal is by most authors considered to be a fundamental aspect of 
a society under the rule of law. Nevertheless, it is clear to any observer that appeal 
proceedings have a dilatory effect. Fryderyk Zoll claims that the fact that in Poland the 
right to appeal is considered to be a constitutional principle stands in the way of 
reducing delay. The knowledge that an appeal can be lodged against a decision of a 
first-instance court may result in a situation where parties and their counsel do not 
invest much time and effort in first-instance proceedings. As a result, a case will last 
longer since it will only become fully developed before the appellate court. If appeal 
proceedings were not available, or if they were available but only if special criteria 
were met, the situation might be different.53 Taking this into consideration, especially 
interlocutory appeals may be looked upon critically. Additionally, the availability of 
more than one appeal against the decision on the merits could be criticised from the 
perspective of delay. The least that can be said is that the filing of unnecessary appeals 
as a delaying tactic should be prevented. The idea that a reduction of the availability 
of and the need for appellate proceedings reduces delay has also been voiced in other 
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countries.54 The intention of the latest German reforms in civil procedure (2001, 
effective from 2002), was to strengthen the position of the court of first instance and 
to turn proceedings of first appeal primarily into a means of correction of errors, thus 
reducing the number of appeals that need to be brought. However, the new rules seem 
not to have the desired effect,55 and this may be a warning for other countries, where 
similar experiments are taking place.56 
 
Delay as a result of several courts consecutively taking cognisance of the same case, 
either as a result of appeal or as a result of other mechanisms, has a long history. 
Before the introduction of the separation of powers, we find an instrument known in 
Scotland as ‘advocation’ (évocation in French) causing serious delays. Advocation 
could be used by the Sovereign. It resulted in a particular case being transferred from 
the court where it was initiated to another, typically higher court. The transfer could 
be due to various reasons, one of them being the importance of the case. Advocation 
was common practice in sixteenth-century Scotland, as is shown by Mark Godfrey, 
and it also occurred in other jurisdictions, for example in the Low Countries.57 
 
Until now, I have assumed that procedural rules are faithfully applied by those 
involved in litigation. I have ignored outright abuse of the rules as a delaying factor. 
Nevertheless, various authors specifically address this matter. Richard Helmholz’s 
paper proves that the dilatory abuse of the rules was recognised as a problem at an 
early stage in the English ecclesiastical courts. 
 
Related to the abuse of rules is the ignoring of rules completely. Good rules lose their 
meaning if they are not applied. An example is the Code of Procedure for the State of 
New York introduced in 1848 (the so-called Field Code). Many of the rules of this 
code were not applied in practice, at least in the initial period, due to the hostility of 
the judges and practitioners. Comparable situations, although not as extreme, may be 
found in other jurisdictions. An example is Germany, where in 1924 the Emminger 
Novelle tried to introduce judicial case management. This Novelle was not successful 
because the judges were reluctant to apply the new rules.58 
 
Rules become powerless not only if they are ignored, but also if effective sanctions are 
lacking59 or if sanctions are not imposed. Richard Helmholz states that in the English 
ecclesiastical courts, lawyers took oaths not to delay justice. Although the judges in 
the spiritual forum could subject any lawyer who violated the oath to discipline 
ranging from a simple admonition to the suspension or even disqualification from 
practice, this did not happen often. Nevertheless, sanctions (especially monetary ones) 
remain a popular means to reduce delay.60 
 
How to reduce delay in court? 
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Many of the dilatory factors that have been identified in the preceding paragraphs 
immediately suggest a solution in order to improve procedural efficiency. I shall not 
discuss these solutions in the present section, since this would be a tedious and 
superfluous exercise. In this section I shall touch upon some issues that have not (or 
have only partly) been discussed until now. 
 
Various measures have been suggested over the centuries to fight delay. Some of them 
aim at preventing litigation altogether. An early experiment to avoid litigation is 
conciliation. The idea of preliminary conciliation goes back to the French 
Revolution61 and ultimately – at least according to some authors - to the model of the 
‘peacemakers’ of the town of Leiden in Holland. Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Spain, 
Austria, Croatia, the Netherlands and Greece may be mentioned as examples of 
countries were experiments with conciliation have taken place in the past or are still 
taking place.62 It should be a caveat for current law reformers that the results of 
conciliation in the past were minimal, leading to its abolition in many jurisdictions 
shortly after its introduction.63 
 
Apart from conciliation, arbitration was advocated as a solution in order to avoid 
delay. Serge Dauchy tells us that in colonial Québec, arbitration was favoured because 
litigation before the state courts was thought to be harmful to the colony; it kept the 
inhabitants away from their labour. However, experiments with arbitration seem not 
to have been successful, something that is very different from the experiences with 
arbitration in today’s world, for example in modern Sweden.64  
 
In addition to arbitration, other methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution are 
currently very popular. The present volume contains information on mediation, which 
is a very successful means to solve disputes in countries like the Netherlands.65 
 
Another way of keeping cases away from the state courts is the introduction of money 
barriers or the requirement of permission to appeal. Kjell Modéer states that in 1915 
the Swedish legislature introduced a rule that every party had to pay 1500 SEK to be 
admitted to the High Court, and no lawsuit with a value less than 1500 SEK was 
admitted. An important question, however, is whether the introduction of money 
barriers and/or the requirement of permission to appeal do not contravene the 
principle of access to justice. The least that can be said is that it seems that the 
requirement of permission to appeal seems more acceptable than the introduction of 
barriers at first instance. England has for a long time known a system of ‘leave to 
appeal’ (now called ‘permission to appeal’) and at the German Bundesgerichtshof, a 
system of permission has also been in place for a considerable amount of time. 
 
When litigation before the state courts cannot be avoided, measures to keep delay 
within acceptable boundaries are very much needed. Remedies against undue delay 
may prove to be valuable. An example of such a remedy is the condemnation in 
expensis pro retardatione processus, which, according to Richard Helmholz, existed 
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in the medieval ecclesiastical courts in England. There, delay caused by the parties 
was considered to be an actionable wrong. Additionally, appeal against dilatory 
behaviour of court officials was available.66 Remedies and sanctions against undue 
delay continue to be popular. In the present volume, Alan Uzelac discusses sanctions 
that are available in Croatia. Present-day Austria also knows a special remedy against 
delay caused by the court: the so-called Fristsetzungsantrag. The procedure is as 
follows: The parties may file a request with the higher court to order the lower court 
to perform the requested procedural act within a certain time-limit. If the court 
performs the requested procedural act within four weeks, the proposal is deemed 
withdrawn unless the applicant affirms the application within two weeks after 
notification. Requests are, however, extremely rare, particularly because the remedy 
itself can lead to further delay.67 
 
Apart from special remedies and sanctions aiming at a reduction of delay, other 
methods are currently being used in order to increase expedition in civil litigation. 
Forcing the parties to prepare their case well is such a method. In England the pre-
action protocols have been introduced for this reason. The interesting feature of these 
protocols is that they encourage litigants to co-operate before the court gets involved, 
an approach that also saves court time if an action is nevertheless started. This is not 
so much the case with the more traditional approaches, where the parties prepare their 
case after the court has become involved under the supervision of a reporter-judge.68 
In a draft bill for the Netherlands dating from the beginning of the twentieth century, 
which was never enacted, the Austrian model of Franz Klein was copied, dividing the 
proceedings into two stages, the first stage aiming at a preparation of the case for the 
plenary hearing.69 The division of cases in two stages in Germany is similar. There, 
the judge may opt for a preliminary hearing or a preliminary written procedure before 
the Haupttermin.70 The traditional pre-trial conferences in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions are another example of this approach. Such a pre-trial conference is 
ordered by Rule 37 / 37A at the Cape, but this rule has, according to Wouter de Vos, 
not been successful in practice. 
 
Part of most preliminary proceedings is the filing of a statement of claim. In some 
countries, plaintiffs are forced to present as much information as possible in their 
statement because this is thought to expedite the hearing of the action. In Hungary, for 
example, the plaintiff at this stage has to state in his statement of claim what evidence 
he relies on. Subsequently, the defendant is obliged to file his response to the 
statement of claim at the first hearing, whereas the plaintiff, in his turn, has to reply to 
this response without delay.71 In the Netherlands, the plaintiff must even discuss an 
anticipated defence in his statement of claim, i.e., before the defendant has filed his 
defence.72 A reduction of the number of additional pleadings would seem to be the 
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natural consequence of this approach.73 Another, more traditional means to obtain a 
full picture of the case at an early stage, is the German Wahrheitspflicht.74 
 
A question related to the above issue is whether the proceedings should focus on the 
substantive or the formal truth. In Croatia the formal truth is being favoured.75 
However, in most Western European countries a movement away from the formal 
truth in the direction of the substantive truth can be observed. It may be that here a 
divide can be observed between former Socialist countries, where, until recently, the 
inquisitorial type of judge who tried to discover the substantive truth reigned supreme, 
and other countries, where such a judge has since long disappeared. 
 
Many authors favour the introduction of oral proceedings as a means to reduce delay 
in civil proceedings. This approach is, for example, advocated in Spain, Germany and 
Finland. At the same time, one should realise that an oral procedure is not a panacea 
for the problem of delay, since a (partly) written procedure may also save court-time, 
for example by preventing extended hearings and by allowing the judges to prepare 
the hearing of the action well. The best approach seems not so much to opt 
exclusively for an oral or written procedure, but to find a good mixture of both 
procedures.76 
 
The question remains whether reforming the rules of procedure is a solution for the 
problems that exist. It is, I think, clear to many professional lawyers that a reduction 
of delay cannot be achieved, or cannot be achieved only by introducing new rules of 
procedure. More forcefully, it seems that rules may often not contribute to swiftness at 
all: Wolfgang Sellert reports that litigation at the Reichshofrat of the Ancien Régime 
was relatively fast precisely because of the absence of a prescribed procedure. 
Likewise, in the early history of the Scottish Court of Session, litigation was swift and 
aspects of the court’s simplified ordinary procedure, being the summary procedure, 
were prescribed to other courts in order to fight delay.77 Therefore, reform should at 
least aim at a simplification of the rules and flexibility.78 Additionally, errors should 
only lead to sanctions if the interest protected by the infringed norm has actually been 
harmed.79 It is clear, of course, that the latter approach should be used with caution, 
because it leaves a considerable amount of discretion to the judge, making the 
application of the rules dependent on his or her views. I agree with authors like Alan 
Uzelac and Kjell Modéer, the latter of whom remarks that delay in civil procedure is 
definitely not a problem solved only with normative rules. In his opinion, delay is 
more a contextual problem than a normative one. Provocatively, Paul Oberhammer 
asks how much regulation procedure really needs. 
 
If one, nonetheless, decides to introduce new rules, the question is how these rules 
should be introduced. First of all, it is better to refrain from law reform if there is no 
political interest in the issue. Law reform in colonial Québec, for example, was 
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successful because the colonial strategy so required. Secondly, lawyers should 
participate in order to ensure that the new rules will be applied in practice.80 And 
thirdly, one should possibly not be too bold. Hamilton Bryson’s paper shows two 
approaches to law reform in the United States. The system of procedure may be 
changed through a single swipe of the legislative guillotine, something that happened 
in New York in the nineteenth century. Or it may occur painlessly and imperceptibly 
over a two hundred year period, as in Virginia. In Virginia, two procedural systems 
were left to exist next to each other: motion pleading was made generally available as 
an alternative to the ancient forms of action pleading. As a result of the attractiveness 
of motion pleading, this type of pleading gradually superseded the forms of action. 
Consequently, when the forms of action were finally abolished in Virginia in 1950, no 
one noticed or was even aware that an 800-year old institution had been finally laid to 
rest. Such an approach may also be observed in Austria (and, I should add, in the 
Netherlands). There, the summary procedure gradually overtook the ordinary 
procedure, finally to replace the ordinary procedure altogether.81 
 
Final remarks 
On the basis of the above, one may conclude that many of the problems in the area of 
delay in civil procedure do not have a national character and are certainly not new. 
Having noted this, it is surprising that national law-making bodies and reform 
commissions are making an effort to solve the existing problems without taking 
developments in other countries into consideration and without looking at past 
experiences. 
 
Apart from adopting a comparative approach, law reformers should ask themselves 
whether the problem of delay in their country is so urgent that it should be tackled at 
all. Michael Macnair suggests that a reduction in delay attracts more business to the 
courts and, consequently, causes delays. Paul Carrington tells the story of an 
inundation occurring in relation to asbestos litigation, ‘when the American judiciary 
built a broad highway to accommodate a class of meritorious claims with economy 
and dispatch’. ‘The result’, however, ‘was not just, nor speedy, nor inexpensive’, the 
author states. 
 
Maybe one should start by focussing on jurisdictions where a good balance82 seems to 
have been struck. An example is Germany, where the average duration of civil trials is 
still satisfactory.83 Or, when looking in the past, the medieval and early-modern 
English ecclesiastical courts, where, according to Richard Helmholz, procedure was 
expeditious, medieval and early-modern Denmark, the early-modern Court of Session 
in Scotland and the early-modern German Reichshofrat. The latter jurisdictions show 
that an expeditious procedure can be framed with a minimal amount of rules. 
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